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Abstract Recently, a novel image encryption scheme
based on improved hyperchaotic sequences was
proposed. A pseudo-random number sequence,
generated by a hyper-chaos system, is used to
determine two involved encryption functions, bitwise
exclusive or (XOR) operation and modulo addition. It
was reported that the scheme can be broken with
some pairs of chosen plain-images and the
corresponding cipherimages. This paper re-evaluates
the security of the encryption scheme and finds that
the encryption scheme can be broken with only one
known plain-image. The performance of the
known-plaintext attack, in terms of success probability
and computation load, become even much better when
two known plain-images are available. In addition,
security defects on insensitivity of the encryption
result with respect to changes of secret key and
plain-image are also reported.
Keywords chaos · image encryption · cryptanalysis ·
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1 Introduction
The popularization of image capture devices and fast
improvement of transmission speed over all kinds of
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networks makes security of images become more and
more important. However, the traditional text
encryption techniques cannot protect images
efficiently due to the big difference between images
and texts. The subtle similarities between chaos and
cryptography, e.g. sensitivity to initial
conditions/control parameter of a chaotic system is
very similar to diffusion with a small change in the
plaintext/secret key of a cryptography system, attract
researchers to consider chaos as a novel way to design
secure and efficient encryption schemes [4, 5, 16].
Meanwhile, some cryptanalysis work demonstrated
that some chaos-based encryption schemes are
insecure against various conventional attacks to
different extents from the viewpoint of modern
cryptology [3, 8, 10, 11, 13–15, 17]. Some general
approaches evaluating security of chaos-based
encryption schemes were summarized in [1, 2].
In [18], a novel image encryption scheme based on
improved hyperchaotic sequences was proposed, where
a pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS), generated
by a four-dimensional hyper-chaos system, is used to
control the modulation addition and the bitwise
exclusive OR operation. Shortly after the publication
of [18], Fatih et al. found that an equivalent secret key
of the encryption scheme can be obtained by a
brute-force method when some chosen plain-images
and the corresponding cipher-images are available [6].
The present paper re-evaluates the security of the
encryption scheme proposed in [18], and discovers the
following security problems: (1) the scope of the
equivalent secret key of the encryption scheme can be
narrowed efficiently by comparing one known
plain-image and the corresponding cipher-image; (2)
the equivalent secret key can be easily confirmed when
two known plain-images and the corresponding
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cipher-images are available; (3) encryption results are
not sensitive with respect to changes of the
plain-images/secret key.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next
section briefly introduces the image encryption scheme
under study. Section 3 reviews the cryptanalysis work
proposed by Fatih et al. and then present an efficient
known-plaintext attack on the image encryption scheme
under study in detail with some experimental results.
The last section concludes the paper.
2 The image encryption scheme under study
The plaintext of the image encryption scheme under
study is a gray scale image. Without loss of generality,
the plain-image can be represented as a
one-dimensional 8-bit integer sequence P = {p(i)}Li=1
by scanning it in the raster order, where L is the
number of pixels of the plain-image, and L is assumed
to be a multiple of 4. Correspondingly, the
cipher-image is denoted by C = {c(i)}Li=1. Then, the
proposed image encryption scheme can be described
as follows1:
– The secret key : initial state (x(0), y(0), z(0), w(0))
of the hyperchaotic system proposed in [12], which
is given as
x˙ = a(y − x) + yz,
y˙ = cx− y − xz + w,
z˙ = xy − bz,
w˙ = dw − xz,
(1)
where (a, b, c, d) = (35, 8/3, 55, 1.3).
– The initialization procedure:
(1) In double-precision floating-point arithmetic,
solve Eq. (1) with the fourth order Runge-Kutta
method with a fixed step length, h = 0.001, N0
times from the initial condition
(x(0), y(0), z(0), w(0)) iteratively, where N0 > 500.
(2) Iterate the above quantization process L/4 more
times and obtain a four-dimensional state sequence
{(x(i), y(i), z(i), w(i))}L/4i=1 .
(3) Generate PRNS K = {k(i)}Li=1 as follows: for
l = 1, 2, . . . , L/4, set k(4l−3) = F (x(l)), k(4l−2) =
F (y(l)), k(4l − 1) = z(x(l)), and k(4l) = F (w(l)),
where
F (x) =
(b(|G(x)| − b|G(x)|c)× 1014c) mod 256,
1 For the sake of completeness, some notations in the
original paper [18] are modified under the condition that the
encryption scheme is not changed.
G(x) = x×102−[x×102], and |x|, [x] and bxc round
x to the absolute value of x, the nearest integers of
x and the nearest integers less than or equal to x,
respectively. Note that
F (x) = (|x× 102 − [x× 102]| × 1014) mod 256
since b|G(x)|c) ≡ 0.
– The encryption procedure includes the following two
rounds of confusion steps.
(1) Confusion I: for i = 2 ∼ L, do
t(i) = p(i)⊕ k(i− 1)⊕ (t(i− 1)u k(i)), (2)
where
t(1) = p(1)⊕ k(1)⊕ (c(0)u k(1)), (3)
c(0) is a predefined integer falling within the interval
[1, 255].
(2) Confusion II: for i = 2 ∼ L, do
c(i) = t(i)⊕ k(i− 1)⊕ (c(i− 1)u k(i)), (4)
where
c(1) = t(1)⊕ k(1)⊕ (t(L)u k(1)). (5)
– The decryption procedure is similar to the
encryption procedure except the following points:
(1) Confusion II is performed first; (2) the
operation on each elements in both of the two
confusion steps is carried out in a reverse order;
(3) the variables t(i) and p(i) in Eq. (2) and the
variables c(i) and t(i) in Eq. (4) are swapped,
respectively.
3 Cryptanalysis
3.1 Attack proposed by Fatih et al.
To make presentation of this paper more complete,
Fatih et al.’s attack proposed in [6] is reviewed and
commented in this subsection.
Substituting Eq. (3) and Eq. (2) into Eq. (5) and
Eq. (4), respectively, one has
c(1) = p(1)⊕ k(1)⊕ (c(0)u k(1))⊕ k(1)⊕ (t(L)u k(1))
= p(1)⊕ (c(0)u k(1))⊕ (t(L)u k(1)) (6)
and
c(i) = p(i)⊕ k(i− 1)⊕ (t(i− 1)u k(i))⊕ k(i− 1)
⊕(c(i− 1)u k(i))
= p(i)⊕ (t(i− 1)u k(i))⊕ (c(i− 1)u k(i)) (7)
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for i = 2 ∼ L. The idea of Fatih et al.’s attack is to
search (t(L), k(1)) and (t(i − 1), k(i)) and verify them
with Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), respectively, where i = 2 ∼ L.
In [6], Fatih et al. choose a plain-image of fixed value
zero, namely p(i) ≡ 0. Success of Fatih et al.’s attack
depends on whether the known values of α and y can
verify the combination of β and x in
y = (αu x)⊕ (β u x), (8)
where α, β, x and y are all 8-bit integers, and
(αu x) = (α+ x) mod 28. Referring to [9], one can see
that it is very difficult to estimate the required
number of known/chosen plain-images assuring the
success of Fatih et al.’s attack. In addition, the
computational complexity of Fatih et al.’s attack is
O(L · 256 · 256 · 4 · 4) = O(220L), which means the
attack complexity is high when L is very large.
3.2 Attack with one known plain-image
In [18, Sec. 3.4], it was claimed that the image
encryption scheme under study is robust against
known/chosen-plaintext attack. However, we found
the encryption scheme can be broken with even only
one known plain-image.
Proposition 1 Assume that one pair of known plain-
image, P = {p(i)}Li=1, and the corresponding cipher-
image, C = {c(i)}Li=1, are available, then the unknown
sequences {t(i)}Li=1 and {k(i)}L−2i=1 are only determined
by the values of k(L− 1) and k(L).
Proof Given the values of k(L − 1) and k(L), from
Eq. (4) one can obtain
t(L) = c(L)⊕ k(L− 1)⊕ (c(L− 1)u k(L)). (9)
Incorporating Eq. (2) into Eq. (4), one has
t(L− 1) = (t(L)⊕ p(L)⊕ k(L− 1))−˙k(L), (10)
where a−˙b = (a − b + 256) mod 256. Then, one can
obtain
k(L−2) = c(L−1)⊕t(L−1)⊕(c(L−2)uk(L−1)). (11)
Similarly, one can obtain{
t(i) = (t(i+ 1)⊕ p(i+ 1)⊕ k(i))−˙k(i+ 1)
k(i− 1) = c(i)⊕ t(i)⊕ (c(i− 1)u k(i)) (12)
for i = L− 2 ∼ 2, and
t(1) = (t(2)⊕ p(2)⊕ k(1))−˙k(2).
Therefore, the proposition is proven.
From Proposition 1, one can see that the
equivalent secret key of the image encryption scheme
under study, {t(i)}Li=1 and {k(i)}Li=1, are only
determined by the values of k(L − 1) and k(L) when
one pair of known-plaintext and the corresponding
cipher-text are available. As t(L) is determined by
k(L − 1) and k(L) via Eq. (9), and t(1) and k(1) are
generated by them in the above iteration form, two
independent equations in the form of Eq. (8), Eq. (3)
and Eq. (5), are available for verification of the search
in this attack method. Success of this attack depends
on whether a wrong version of (k(L − 1), k(L)) can
generate the corresponding version of (t(1), t(L), k(1))
passing the verification of Eq. (3) and Eq. (5). Assume
that t(1), t(L) and k(1) satisfy an uniform
distribution, the probability of passing verification of
Eq. (3) and Eq. (5) are both 1256 . Therefore, only a
small number of k(L − 1) and k(L) can pass the
verification. As shown in Sec. 3.4, {k(i)}Li=1 and
{k(i) ⊕ 128}Li=1 are equivalent for
encryption/decryption (excluding the most significant
bit plane) of the image encryption scheme under
study, they are considered as the same one in this
section. Note that {c(i)}Li=1, {k(i)}Li=1 and L all have
influence on the verification, the success rate is very
hard to be estimated. To illustrate this problem, the
image “Peppers” of size 512 × 512, shown in Fig. 2a),
is chosen as the known plain-image, the number of
possible versions of {k(i)}Li=1 passing the verification
under one hundred random secret keys are shown in
Fig. 1. As for 5% of the one hundred random secret
keys, the equivalent secret key can be confirmed
definitely. As for more than 70% of them, the scope
size of equivalent secret key is less than 6. When
(x(0), y(0), z(0), w(0)) = (5, 10, 5, 10), N0 = 1000 and
c(0) = 3 (the key used in [18, Sec. 3]), one of the
possible versions of {k(i)}Li=1 passing the verification
is used to decrypt the cipher-image shown in Fig. 2,
and the result is shown in Fig. 2d). It is counted that
60.13% of the pixels of the image shown in Fig. 2d)
are correct, which shows that even the wrong version
may be used to recover some information of the
cipher-image. Therefore, we can conclude that this
attack is very effective. From Proposition 2, one can
see that (k(L − 1), k(L)) = (a, b) and
(k(L − 1), k(L)) = (a, b ⊕ 128) are equivalent for
Eq. (10). Therefore, the computation complexity of
this attack can be estimated as
O(256 · 128 · L · 2 · 3) = O(217L).
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Fig. 1 The number of possible versions of {k(i)}Li=1 passing
the verification under every set of random secret key.
a) c)
b) d)
Fig. 2 The known-plaintext attack I: a) known plain-image
“Peppers”; b) the cipher-image of “Peppers”; c) the cipher-
image of a plain-image “Lenna”; d) decryption result of
Fig. 2c).
3.3 Attack with two known plain-images
When two known plain-images, P1 = {p1(i)}Li=1 and
P2 = {p2(i)}Li=1, and the corresponding cipher-images,
C1 = {c1(i)}Li=1, C2 = {c2(i)}Li=1, are available,
coincidence of two versions of {k(i)}1i=L−2 can be used
as L− 2 independent conditions to verify the search of
(k(L − 1), k(L)) in the above sub-section. Therefore,
the success probability of obtaining the equivalent
secret key can be improved greatly and the attack
complexity can be much reduced at the same time.
The detailed approach of the attack can be
described as follows.
– Step 1) Set i = L − 1 and (k(L − 1), k(L)) with a
possible set of values and obtain
t1(L) = c1(L)⊕ k(L− 1)⊕ (c1(L− 1)u k(L))
and
t2(L) = c2(L)⊕ k(L− 1)⊕ (c2(L− 1)u k(L)).
– Step 2) Set i = i− 1. If i > 1 and
c1(i)⊕ t1(i)⊕ (c1(i− 1)u k(i)) = c2(i)⊕ t2(i)
⊕(c2(i− 1)u k(i)), (13)
repeat Step 2); otherwise go to Step 1), where{
t1(i) = (t1(i+ 1)⊕ p1(i+ 1)⊕ k(i))−˙k(i+ 1),
t2(i) = (t2(i+ 1)⊕ p2(i+ 1)⊕ k(i))−˙k(i+ 1).
(14)
– Step 3) If i = 1,
c1(1) = t1(1)⊕ k(1)⊕ (t1(L)u k(1)) (15)
or
c2(1) = t2(1)⊕ k(1)⊕ (t2(L)u k(1)), (16)
output the value of (k(L−1), k(L)); otherwise go to
Step 1).
Now, let’s analyze the performance of the above
attack. Observe Eq. (13), one has
Prob(t) =
t∏
i=L−2
Prob(i),
where Prob(i) denotes the probability of
condition (13) being satisfied, and
t ∈ {L − 2, L − 3, · · · , 1}. Obviously, Eq. (13) can be
considered as a function in the form of Eq. (8). Given
variable α, β, x, y of uniform distribution, the
probability that Eq. (8) holds is 1/256. Assume
{t(i)}Li=1, {c(i)}Li=1 and {k(i)}Li=1 distribute uniformly,
one can get Prob(t) = (1/256)L−1−t. Therefore, one
can assure that {k(i)}L−1i=1 , {t1(i)}Li=1 and {t2(i)}Li=1
can be determined in a very extremely high
probability when the variable i in Step 3) can reach to
L − 5. Once t1(1), t1(L), t2(1), t2(L), k(1) are
determined, the remaining values of k(L) can be
further confirmed with condition (15) or
condition (16). In addition, Eq. (5) can also be used
for verification. Now, one can conclude that {k(i)}L−1i=1
can be determined with an extremely high probability
when L ≥ 5. The computational complexity of this
attack is
O(256 · 128 · 5 · (3 · 2 + 7) + L · 2 · 3) = O(221 + 6L),
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which is much smaller than that of Fatih et al.’s
attack.
To verify the above analysis, some experiments
were performed. Beside the pair of known plain-image
and the corresponding cipher-image shown in Fig. 2,
another plain-image “Babarra” and the encrypted
version, shown in Fig. 3a), and Fig. 3b), respectively,
are used. Then, the obtained equivalent secret key is
used to decrypt the cipher-image shown in Fig. 2c)
and the recovery result is shown in Fig. 3c), which is
identical with the original version.
a) b)
c)
Fig. 3 The known-plaintext attack II: a) the second known
plain-image “Babarra”; b) the cipher-image of plain-image
“Babarra”; c) decryption result of Fig. 2c).
3.4 Two other security defects
In this subsection, two other security defects of the
image encryption scheme under study are discussed.
– Low sensitivity with respect to changes of secret key
In [18, Sec. 3.3.1], it was concluded that the image
encryption scheme under study is sensitive to
changes of secret key from experimental results on
some selected secret keys. However, this conclusion
lacks a firm ground. Assume there is another secret
key generating PRNS {k′(i)}Li=1, where
{k(i) ⊕ k′(i)}Li=1 = {0, 128}. Let {t′(i)}Li=1 and
{c′(i)}Li=1 denote the corresponding intermediate
sequence and cipher-image, respectively. From
Eq. (2) and Proposition 2, one has t′(1) = t(1),
t′(i) =
{
t(i) if S(i) = 0;
t(i)⊕ 128 otherwise, (17)
for i = 2 ∼ L, where
S(i) =
{
0 if (k(1)⊕ k′(1)⊕ k(i)⊕ k′(i)) = 0;
1 otherwise,
Then, one further has
c′(i) =
{
c(i) if S(L) = 1;
c(i)⊕ 128 otherwise,
for i = 1, 2. Based on mathematical deduction, one
can obtain
c′(i) =
{
c(i) if (S(L) +
∑i−1
j=2 S(j)) is even,
c(i)⊕ 128 otherwise,
for i = 3 ∼ L. The above analysis shows that
K ′ = {k′(i)}Li=1 is equivalent to K = {k(i)}Li=1
with respect to the encryption/decryption
procedure of the least 7 significant bit plane of the
plain-image, where k′(i) ∈ {k(i), k(i) ⊕ 128}.
Therefore, there are at least 2L equivalent secret
keys for each secret key of the image encryption
scheme under study. This serious defect also exists
in some other chaotic encryption schemes [1, 2, 7].
– Low sensitivity with respect to change of plain-image
As well-known in the field of cryptology, sensitivity
of encryption results with respect to changes of
plaintext is an important property measuring a
secure encryption scheme. This property is
especially important for secure image encryption
schemes for the following reasons: (1) strong
redundancy exists among neighboring pixels of an
uncompressed plain-image; (2) a plain-image and
its watermarked versions, which generally modify
the original image slightly, are often encrypted at
the same time. In [18, Sec. 3.3.2], it is claimed that
the proposed encryption scheme is very sensitive
with respect to changes of plain-image. However,
the claim is questionable for the following reasons:
(1) there is no nonlinear operation, such as S-box,
is involved in the whole encryption scheme; 2)
there is no operation generating carry bit toward
lower level in the whole scheme, so one bit of
plain-image can only influence the bits in higher
bit planes of the corresponding cipher-image. This
defect is very common for chaos-based encryption
schemes [1, Sec. 2.2].
Proposition 2 Assume α and β are n-bit
non-negative integers, then
(α⊕ 2n−1)u β = (αu β)⊕ 2n−1.
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Proof First, α ⊕ 2n−1 = α u 2n−1 can be proven for
the following two cases: (1) when α ≥ 2n−1, one has
α ⊕ 2n−1 = α − 2n−1 = α u 2n−1; (2) when α < 2n−1,
one has α ⊕ 2n−1 = α + 2n−1 = α u 2n−1. Therefore,
(α⊕ 2n−1)u β = (αu β)u 2n−1 = (αu β)⊕ 2n−1.
4 Conclusion
This paper re-evaluated the security of a novel image
encryption scheme in detail. It was found that the
encryption scheme can be effectively broken with only
two known plain-images. Both mathematical proofs
and experimental results were presented to support
the proposed attack. In addition, some other security
defects of the encryption scheme were also shown.
This paper sets up a good example framework for
security analysis of chaotic cryptosystems.
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